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 KEY POINTS
• The UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) has a complex bureaucratic structure, at the apex 
of which is a Partnership Council.
• The Partnership Council has powers to amend most of the TCA by mutual agreement, and there will be 
five-yearly reviews of the operation of the TCA.
• The UK regime for managing subsidies will be very similar to the EU system; the TCA will allow the UK 
and EU to challenge each other’s subsidies, ultimately referring disputes to arbitration.
• On labour standards and the environment, the EU and UK have committed not to weaken standards in 
ways that affect trade or investment and there is a fairly rigorous procedure for addressing violations.
• In addition, there are highly innovative procedures for rebalancing the trade elements of the TCA (and 
ultimately cancelling them) if one side changes its standards in ways that materially affect trade.
o   Such rebalancing can be triggered in several circumstances, including via periodic reviews of the 
whole trade relationship.
o   While these last provisions create scope for the relationship to develop, they also create 
considerable uncertainty and could cause almost constant negotiation and tension between the EU 
and the UK.
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INTRODUCTION
This Briefing Paper continues the discussion of the 
UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) 2020, 
started in two companion pieces, Briefing Papers 
52 and 53. It is primarily concerned with the so-
called level playing field provisions, which were so 
contentious during the negotiation and are innovative 
in outcome. The issues are essentially those of 
governance and enforcement/dispute settlement, 
so we start by discussing the overall governance 
structure of the TCA and its main dispute settlement 
provisions. 
The paper then focuses on four specific issues 
within Part Two, Heading One, Title XI ‘Level playing 
field for open and fair competition and sustainable 
development’: subsidies; labour and social standards; 
environment and climate; and the rebalancing 
provisions. We argue that, unless great political 
delicacy is exhibited, these areas contain the seeds 
of perpetual negotiation and dispute.
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF 
THE TCA
Structurally the TCA takes the form of an Association 
Agreement (similar to agreements the EU has with a 
number of third countries).1 It contains a Partnership 
Council, with a system of twenty Specialised 
Committees and four Working Groups, plus discussion 
procedures to deal with specific elements. The 
Partnership Council can make amendments to the 
TCA and to any supplementing agreements ‘in the 
cases provided for’ in the agreement. The TCA 
contains provision for periodic updates and for 
five-yearly reviews of “the implementation of this 
Agreement and supplementing agreements and any 
matters related” (emphasis added). Following these 
reviews, with one year’s notice, either side can 
terminate the agreement (Art FINPROV.8).  
Changes to the TCA in the Partnership Council are 
to be taken by mutual consent. On the one hand, 
this could open up a pathway for permanent friction 
and ongoing disputes and negotiations with the 
EU. On the other hand, it offers protection to each 
side that in making adjustments to the Agreement 
(which are likely to be necessary or desirable as 
trading conditions change), its current level of net 
benefits need not be eroded. In the absence of major 
concessions towards the EU negotiating positions, it 
will be hard for the UK to improve trading conditions 
in future, for instance, to introduce mutual recognition 
of conformity assessment, diagonal cumulation, or 
market access in important services sectors (see 
Briefing Papers 52 and 53 on these issues). 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
In any Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the arrangements 
which govern the Agreement are of central 
importance, especially in the event of non-
compliance: how does one party seek redress 
if the other party ‘transgresses’? For the UK, it 
was politically unacceptable for jurisdiction to be 
given to the European Court of Justice, so a formal 
arbitration process was developed which kicks in if 
disputes cannot be resolved more amicably. In the 
negotiations, the EU wanted a unified governance 
structure which would enable robust enforcement, 
including cross-sectoral retaliation, whilst the UK 
advocated multiple governance structures which 
would prevent the latter from happening. The final 
1  An ‘association agreement’ is defined in Art 217 of the TFEU as 
“an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common 
action and special procedures.” This implies a closer relationship 
between Parties than those negotiations conducted under Art 218, 
the basis for the negotiations with Canada and Singapore.
outcome is a compromise, but one that leans more 
towards the EU position than towards that of the 
UK. As we show below, it is unclear whether the 
compromise offers the best of both worlds or the 
worst.
The top level of dispute settlement (Part Six, Title 
I) applies to the whole agreement except for ten 
specified areas which either have no procedures 
for settling dispute (but which, like everything else, 
can be taken to the Partnership Council) or have 
alternative arrangements (Art INST.10). Broadly, it 
foresees confidential consultations between the 
Parties, allows for a request for an independent 
arbitration procedure, and compliance review (Part 6, 
Title I; ANNEX INST-X). In the event of non-compliance, 
the respondent party may offer ‘temporary 
compensation’ (Part Six, Title I, Art INST.24.1, 
Temporary remedies) and/or the complaining 
party may notify the other party of any intended 
suspension of obligations (Art INST.24.2), subject to 
certain conditions. The decisions and rulings of the 
arbitration tribunal are binding on both Parties (Art 
INST.29).
LEVEL PLAYING FIELD
The level playing field refers to regulations governing 
business that are not specific to any particular 
production sector. The TCA deals with these in Title 
XI of Part Two, Heading One, Level Playing Field 
for Open and Fair Competition and Sustainable 
Development (LPFS), and includes: Competition policy 
(Ch 2), Subsidies (Ch 3), State-owned enterprises 
(Ch 4), Taxation (Ch 5), Labour and Social Standards 
(not including social security and pensions) (Ch 
6), Environment and Climate (Ch 7) and Other 
Instruments for trade and Sustainable Development 
(Ch 8). Here we focus on subsidies, labour and social 
standards, environment and climate, and also on 
'rebalancing' (Ch 9), each of which were particularly 
contentious negotiating areas. We detail the 
provisions as well as their potential for far-reaching 
consequences. 
SUBSIDIES
The question of how the future regulation of public 
subsidies in the UK would sit with the wide-ranging 
EU state aid provisions was one of the final battles 
fought in the negotiations leading to the TCA. 
Provisions relating to state regulation are not normally 
found in international trade treaties, and while the 
regulation of the use of subsidies is found in WTO 
law, the provisions lack the robustness of historical 
evolution deriving from the day-to-day practice and 
enforcement that the European Commission and the 
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European Courts have witnessed with EU provisions. 
The concession of the negotiators in the TCA is to 
use the language of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures 1995 to avoid the 
semblance that the UK was adopting the EU state aid 
regime. Realistically, it is inconceivable that the UK 
could break away from the principles and procedures 
underpinning EU law and, indeed, we discover that 
the UK has agreed, in different words, to adopt many 
of the tried and tested rules of EU state aid law 
and policy. It has also committed to creating a new 
national subsidy control body to ensure adherence to 
a set of rules very similar to the law and policy of the 
EU. 
The subsidy control rules are found in Title XI, 
Chapter Three. The provisions set out a number of 
definitions. Most importantly, defining a subsidy 
(Art 3.1): a subsidy must confer an advantage 
and be specific. The latter phrase is adopted from 
WTO law and is designed to play the same role as 
“selective” in EU law, used to denote the illegality 
of measures that favour certain firms or individuals. 
The subsidy must have actual or potential effects on 
trade and investment between the parties. Article 
3.2 sets out the situations where public money 
may be used without infringing the TCA, e.g. to 
compensate damage caused by natural disasters, or 
other exceptional non-economic events. Subsidies 
to consumers are also exempted. There is a de 
minimis provision (EUR 380,000, over three years). 
There are also specific exclusions. Subsidies to the 
audio-visual sector are excluded from the scope of the 
TCA, which frees the UK from some complicated EU 
rules. The TCA does not apply to subsidies granted 
on a temporary basis to respond to a national or 
global economic emergency, provided such subsidies 
are targeted, proportionate and effective. Article 3.3 
excludes subsidies granted to providers of services 
of “public economic interest” if the application of 
the rules would obstruct providers from performing 
their tasks. This again attempts to create a different 
language from merely transposing EU law, but finds its 
basis in Article 106 TFEU which refers to Services of 
General Economic Interest. Article 3.3.2 requires the 
avoidance of over-compensation and cross-subsidy, 
principles derived from European Commission policy 
and soft law, as well as the Court of Justice of 
the European Union case law. Article 3.3.4 fixes a 
higher de minimis threshold for such subsidies. 
The TCA sets out general principles to be applied 
to all subsidies in Article 3.4.1 and guidance in 
applying the principles is found in a Joint Declaration 
on Subsidy Control Policies. Articles 3.4.2 and 3.5 
identify subsidies that have an actual or potential 
“material” effect on trade or investment between 
the parties and which must be avoided. Article 3.5 
creates special rules for assistance for secure and 
sustainable energy and environmental sustainability, 
and large cross border or international cooperation 
projects.
Article 3 does not mention Article 10 of the Ireland/
Northern Ireland Protocol. This provision in the 
Protocol applies the EU state aid rules to measures 
that have an actual or potential effect on trade in 
goods between Northern Ireland and the EU. Thus, 
both provisions apply alongside each other, but with 
no explanation as to how any issues or conflicts will 
be resolved.
Unlike the EU state aid regime, the UK has not 
committed to an ex-ante notification process for new 
subsidies. There is a commitment to transparency in 
Article 3.7, whereby all subsidies must be published 
within six months. If an interested party raises 
concerns about a subsidy, Article 3.7.5 states 
that the party must be provided with all relevant 
information within 28 days.
Other new aspects of subsidy enforcement include 
the creation of an independent authority or body 
that will play “an appropriate role” in the governance 
of state aid. So far this has not occurred, but BEIS 
issued guidance on compliance with international 
subsidy laws on 31 December 2020.2
The residual power of the courts to hear applications 
for judicial review is recognised, as well as the power 
to review compliance with the new subsidy principles 
by subsidy-granting authorities and the power to 
review decisions of the independent authority. 
Challenges may be brought by interested parties 
with standing. The courts have the power to grant 
remedies, including injunctions, and orders to recover 
illegal subsidies. Under Article 3.10.2 the EU can 
appear as an intervening party in any court action 
in the UK concerning the subsidy rules (and vice 
versa). Also, either party can seek information and 
consultations (Art 3.12).
If there is evidence that a UK subsidy will cause, or 
runs a serious risk of causing a significant negative 
effect on trade and investment between the UK and 
the EU, then the EU may take remedial action. Any 
remedial action must be limited to what is strictly 
necessary and proportionate to remedy the significant 
effect. The UK may challenge the EU action if it 
considers the action to be excessive by taking the 
case to an arbitration panel. A failure to comply with 
any arbitration panel ruling allows the UK to take 
2 BEIS, 'Complying with the UK's international obligations 
on subsidy control: guidance for public authorities' (31.12.20): 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/complying-with-the-
uks-international-obligations-on-subsidy-control-guidance-for-public-
authorities   
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remedial action.
There is also a provision stating that any failure to 
comply with the general subsidy rules (except Arts 3.9 
and 3.10) may be referred to a dispute settlement 
procedure under the general dispute settlement rules 
in Part Six, Title I.
The UK has achieved a degree of independence from 
the EU state aid rules. It has negotiated for higher 
de minimis and public service subsidy thresholds, for 
special provisions to allow for a post-COVID19 special 
recovery programme to level up regions and to be able 
to keep a check on how the Member States of the EU 
use public money to stimulate their economies. It has 
also ensured that general provisions relating to tax 
and infrastructure projects will not be caught by the 
subsidy rules and that the dispute mechanisms that 
address problems with EU state aid and UK subsidies 
are independent of the European Commission and the 
European Courts. Inevitably the application of Article 
10 of the Northern Ireland Protocol will create legal 
and practical issues in the future, but for an eleventh-
hour compromise, the UK and the EU would seem to 
have achieved a workable compromise on one of the 
thorniest parts of the Brexit negotiations.
LABOUR AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
STANDARDS
Going into the negotiation, the EU proposed 
an obligation for both sides to uphold common 
environmental standards in a broad range of 
areas. These standards could be raised by mutual 
agreement, the so-called 'ratchet clause'. The UK 
advocated a weaker, ‘Canada-style’ approach that 
required each side to uphold its own domestic 
standards.3  In the EU proposal, any lowering of 
common standards constituted regression, making 
it look less like preserving EU competitiveness 
and more like a general environmental protection 
agreement. In the UK’s Canada-style proposal, the 
weakening of protections is challengeable under the 
TCA if it takes place ‘in a manner affecting’ trade and 
investment, which narrows the scope and focuses it 
back toward ensuring that neither side competitively 
undercuts the other. 
At first glance, the UK has won the battle. The cores 
of the labour and environmental provisions embrace 
the non-regression language from a ‘Canada-style’ 
Agreement, mirroring the UK’s proposal. On closer 
inspection, however, the UK has made significant 
3 E Lydgate, 'Environment and climate change in the EU-UK 
negotiations: Arguing the toss over nothing' (UKTPO blog, 26.05.20) 
https://blogs.sussex.ac.uk/uktpo/2020/05/26/environment-and-
climate-change-in-the-eu-uk-negotiations-arguing-the-toss-over-nothing/ 
concessions. These mostly take the form of 
enforcement mechanisms that are much stronger 
than those the UK proposed, which we address 
below. There are also some novel elements that go 
beyond the UK’s traditionalist approach4, notably on 
precaution and climate change.
PRECAUTION
Unusually for an EU FTA, the precautionary approach 
features heavily in the TCA. Article 1.2.2 upholds 
the precautionary approach5, and is enforceable with 
sanctions for non-compliance, suggesting its likely 
strategic importance to the EU. Article 7.4.1(c) further 
affirms its application to both parties. Alongside 
these more general affirmations of the principle, the 
TCA specifies that non-regression requirements apply 
to antibiotics/decontaminants and chemicals. 
So, what does this mean in practice, and in particular 
for food standards deregulation? The TCA Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary (SPS) chapter, which addresses 
the product-related regulatory standards at the core 
of current controversies about food standards, does 
not mention precaution. But its inclusion in the 
general provisions for the LPFS means that either 
side can complain that the other has not adhered to 
the precautionary approach. More specifically, if the 
UK started to produce chlorinated chicken, the EU 
could initiate a dispute alleging that it had regressed 
in the area of decontaminants, and failed to uphold 
the precautionary approach. This could ultimately 
result in the EU imposing tariffs on UK products. The 
EU already bans the import of chlorinated chicken 
– indeed, all UK food products being exported to 
the EU are subject to EU regulatory requirements. 
This means that theoretically, the EU could not only 
maintain the ban but also subject the UK to additional 
tariffs for failing to uphold the precautionary principle. 
In practice, however, it is hard to see why the EU 
would be motivated to pursue such a complaint – it 
seems more likely that its concerns would focus on 
wider production conditions, a point which we explain 
further below. 
4  In its draft EU-UK FTA for negotiations, the UK did not simply 
model its position after a ‘Canada-style’ FTA, it copy-pasted the Trade 
and Environment chapter of the EU-Canada FTA (CETA) (see link 
above). 
5  Title XI, Art 1.2.2: “The Parties acknowledge that, in accordance 
with the precautionary approach, where there are reasonable grounds 
for concern that there are potential threats of serious or irreversible 
damage to the environment or human health, the lack of full scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason for preventing a Party from 
adopting appropriate measures to prevent such damage.” 
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The definition of precaution explicitly derives from 
the Rio Declaration,6 which uses the word ‘approach’ 
rather than ‘principle’ precisely due to historical US 
objections to giving precaution too much legal weight. 
The footnote to Article 1.2 states that in the EU 
‘precautionary approach’ means the application of the 
‘precautionary principle’, which in turn implies that 
the UK has ensured that the domestic requirement for 
it to uphold precaution is relatively weaker than that 
applied in the EU. In the event of a disagreement or 
dispute, this seems to offer the EU protection in its 
use of the ‘principle’, whilst making it more difficult 
for the EU to argue that the UK is not upholding the 
‘approach’. 
CLIMATE
There are a number of commitments on climate 
not found in previous EU FTAs. These include the 
reaffirmation of both sides’ net-zero targets, which 
is covered under the standard dispute settlement. 
The TCA addresses carbon pricing, making clear that 
flights between the UK and EU will be subject to 
charges, and obliging the EU and UK to cooperate and 
work toward linking their schemes. This is novel for 
an FTA, and represents an interesting EU precedent 
for post-net-zero FTAs; it may also be significant in 
that it may well form the basis for exempting the UK 
from any EU border carbon adjustments (BCAs). The 
progress on climate shows how much can be achieved 
when the two sides agree on the fundamental 
objectives. 
REMEDIAL MEASURES
The TCA features a number of mechanisms by which 
either side can apply remedial measures against 
the other, resulting in a complex web of dispute 
settlement processes. In addition to the overall 
arbitration procedures discussed above, there are 
bespoke measures for the non-regression elements 
of labour and environmental standards (see Annex). 
As in a ‘Canada-style’ FTA, there are specialist 
panels of experts dedicated to environment and 
labour provisions. Article 9 details a standard ladder-
style escalation of disputes from consultation to 
arbitration. The decision as to what to do about 
the recommendations of an expert panel’s report is 
unilateral (Art 9.2.16), but Article 9.2.19 then opens 
6  Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (‘Rio Declaration’), Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992, UN 
General Assembly, A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I): https://www.un.org/en/
development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/
globalcompact/A_CONF.151_26_Vol.I_Declaration.pdf 
it up to various elements of the general arbitration 
process which permit temporary retaliation (Part Six, 
Title I, Art. INST. 24-25). This departs from standard 
EU practice, in which rulings, though considered 
binding, cannot be redressed through tariffs. It is also 
a significant concession on the UK side. 
REBALANCING: DYNAMIC ALIGNMENT 
IN DISGUISE? 
The most innovative elements of dispute settlement 
in the TCA are the mechanisms outlined in Article 
9.4 for so-called ‘rebalancing’. The Article defines 
two processes, one dealing only with the areas of 
subsidy control, labour and social standards and 
environment and climate, and a second dealing 
with any issue arising from any trade provision. The 
former states in Article 9.4.2: “If material impacts 
on trade or investment between the Parties are 
arising as a result of significant divergences between 
the Parties [in these areas], either Party may take 
appropriate rebalancing measures to address the 
situation”, where appropriate means “what is strictly 
necessary and proportionate in order to remedy the 
situation” (emphasis added). Notable in this are 
the phrases ‘are arising’ (i.e. they actually have 
to be happening at the point of taking action?), 
‘significant divergences’ (you need more than one to 
raise a complaint?) and ‘remedy the situation’ (what 
situation?). All this is subject to arbitration but on a 
very accelerated time scale and with trade measures 
applied in the meantime. 
In clauses 4-9 Article 9.4 provides for reviews of the 
whole of the trade provision in the TCA that could end 
in its termination. These can be triggered by either 
party every four years if it feels the arrangement has 
become unbalanced or more frequently if “measures 
[on subsidies, labour or environment] … have been 
taken frequently by either or both Parties, or if a 
measure that has a material impact on the trade or 
investment between the Parties has been applied for 
a period of 12 months.” The latter clause appears to 
refer to any measure.
Article 9.4 is forward-looking: whilst the non-
regression requirements focus on preventing the 
deregulation of current environment and labour 
standards, rebalancing addresses divergence in future 
policies and priorities. It constitutes a defensive 
version of dynamic alignment: defensive in that 
rather than ongoing cooperation and harmonisation, 
it provides another means for each side to coerce the 
other.
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SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAINTY
There is significant uncertainty about how these 
provisions will work, and how often each side will 
actually use them. The emphasis on future divergence 
suggests that one side may be tasked with proving 
that the other side is not keeping pace with its own 
regulation and that the resultant lack of change is 
giving its partner a trade and investment advantage. 
Presumably, although this is not guaranteed, the 
EU will be less concerned about imbalances from 
tightening its product standards because the UK 
already has to meet EU requirements to export to the 
EU. 
Instead, the EU interest in rebalancing seems more 
concerned with environmental or labour standards 
regulations that tend to raise its industrial costs in 
the name of other objectives and which the UK fails 
to emulate. An example would be the UK’s failure 
to keep pace with EU requirements for industrial 
emissions, which the European Commission raised in 
Brexit negotiations,7 or the forthcoming Directive on 
transparent and predictable working conditions.8 
Assuming the EU wanted to ‘rebalance’, it would 
need to prove that the UK’s failure to keep pace had 
a ‘material impact on trade and investment based 
on reliable evidence and not merely on conjecture 
or remote possibility.’ Creating a clear causal link 
between a change to regulation and an impact on 
trade and investment may well prove challenging. 
The EU’s measures would be subject to review by an 
arbitral tribunal, but there is uncertainty about how 
these novel mechanisms would be applied. 
‘Material impact’ might be interpreted as a hybrid 
between the concept of ‘material injury’ applied when 
calculating anti-dumping duties and the concept of 
‘in a manner affecting trade’ in the non-regression 
requirement, which focuses on deregulation of poor 
enforcement of domestic laws, and its competitive 
impacts on FTA partners. A panel would not be bound 
by precedents, if there were any, but if it wanted for 
guidance it could look to a dispute under the non-
regression requirements for labour standards in the 
Dominican Republic-Central America-United States 
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). The US argued that 
Guatemala had failed to enforce its own labour laws, 
giving it a competitive advantage over US workers. 
The Panel concluded that there was insufficient 
7 European Commission, 'Internal EU27 preparatory discussions 
on the framework for the future relationship: Level playing field' (TF50 
(2018) 27, 31.01.18):  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/
beta-political/files/level_playing_field.pdf
8  Highlighted here: D Chalmer, 'British sovereignty run by Europe' 
(UK in a Changing Europe blog, 29.12.20): https://ukandeu.ac.uk/
british-sovereignty-run-by-europe/
evidence of cost savings as a result of enforcement 
failures, and no way of knowing if these would in 
turn have been sufficient to confer a competitive 
advantage.9
This suggests that a cost-based approach to 
evaluating a ‘material impact’ would likely make it 
difficult for the EU to hold the UK’s feet to the fire, 
though the EU could potentially have an easier time 
proving that prices had risen relative to the Parties’ 
shared starting point. These common standards 
provide a baseline at the start of 2021. The tribunal 
might also adopt a more expansive interpretation 
of material impact. The concept of material injury in 
anti-dumping investigations, which may also form a 
source of inspiration, includes threat of injury, a more 
expansive basis for countermeasures, although the 
Article prevents reliance on ‘conjecture’.  
The EU would also need to show that its proposed 
response was ‘strictly necessary and proportionate 
in order to remedy the situation’. The tribunal would 
also need to decide what the situation was that 
required ‘remedy’. If the perceived ‘remedy’ were to 
force the UK to follow the EU to a higher standard, 
targeted and swingeing trade barriers by the EU would 
be the presumptive solution and hence might well be 
ruled acceptable. If, on the other hand, the remedy 
was seen to be to try to offset the UK’s competitive 
advantage from not adopting the new measures, the 
proportionate measures would be smaller tariffs on 
selected, or even, many UK exports to the EU. 
It is also noteworthy that rebalancing measures are 
not defined. It is unclear whether they are limited to 
the usual suspension of parts of the Agreement, ie 
the application of tariffs, or could blend into unrelated 
areas of policy cooperation. 
WHAT DOES THIS IMPLY FOR THE 
LONG RUN? 
Whilst these granular issues of interpretation are 
significant, the rebalancing process ultimately 
provides more avenues for the EU and UK to 
override adverse third-party rulings and call the 
entire Agreement into question. Thus, the overriding 
implication of rebalancing is to build more uncertainty 
and volatility into the TCA. 
This is exacerbated by the fast-track nature of the 
arbitration mechanism: the Agreement provides two 
weeks for consultations and rebalancing measures 
can be applied if they fail, and only 30 days for 
9  Dominican Republic – Central America – United States of 
America, In the Matter of Guatemala – Issues Relating to the 
Obligations Under Article 16.2.1(a) of the CAFTA-DR, Final Report of 
the Panel, circulated June 14 2017, paras. 462-465.
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A final question is the significance of this novel 
mechanism for EU trade strategy more broadly. The 
idea of unilaterally imposing tariffs to ‘countervail’ 
harmful subsidies is hardly new. Indeed, the TCA 
outlines parallel procedures that allow for this under 
Article 3.12, giving rise to the question of why we 
need two mechanisms to achieve this. But applying 
unilateral remedies to offset labour and environmental 
deregulation, or the failure to keep pace, is a new and 
interesting trend. In fact, the US has just put forward 
a proposal to classify poor environmental protection 
as a subsidy that can be countered with unilateral 
retaliation.10 It is unclear whether the EU’s proposal 
in this area is specific to the UK, or whether it will be 
applying similar logic in future FTAs, or in the WTO.
10  WTO, 'Advancing sustainability goals through trade rules to 
level the playing field' WT/GC/W/814 (17.12.20): https://docs.wto.
org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/GC/W814.
pdf&Open=True
the arbitral tribunal to rule on their legality of the 
latter. This gives no time for considered evaluations 
or mediation and therefore merely amounts to 
authorised action by one party or the other. 
Both the extended ‘Panel of Experts’ procedure for 
non-regression and the break-neck arbitration of 
rebalancing potentially sow the seeds of political 
strife. Panel proceedings may be confidential, but the 
basic issues they deal with could not be kept out of 
the public domain. The danger is particularly acute 
for the rebalancing question, which, as we noted 
above, could easily be seen as dynamic adjustment 
in disguise: the EU tightens some standards and if 
this eventually appears to be affecting EU-UK trade, 
proposes to impose restrictions on UK exports to 
rebalance the trade-offs in the TCA. While it may be 
in the UK’s overall interests to accept the higher 
standards and keep trade flowing, it would not be 
entirely unreasonable to characterise this chain of 
events as coercive and an affront to UK sovereignty. 
Given the rhetoric surrounding Brexit and the 
subsequent trade negotiations, it is difficult to see 
either the UK popular press or the Conservative 
benches in the House of Commons not raising a 
storm. 
What are the solutions? First, the EU could curtail 
its push towards higher labour and environmental 
standards: that is, because pursuing this policy 
would lead to the loss of trade with the UK, it could 
judge the cost too great. Second, the EU could just 
accept that higher standards may lead to competitive 
disadvantage. Third, UK politicians could work to 
dampen the ardour of ‘sovereign-istas’ by explaining 
that, unfortunate though it is, the (relatively small) 
UK would be better off to accept either the change in 
standards or the introduction of trade barriers than 
to endanger the whole TCA. Finally, UK governments 
could work proactively with the EU to evolve joint 
views about necessary standards and introduce 
changes together. We cannot predict how this will turn 
out. Much depends on political leadership in the UK 
and the EU. But the possibility of continuing friction 
and bad feeling is undeniable. 
Moreover, if there is a series of rebalancing episodes, 
if either party triggers the review provided for in Art 
9.4, or anyway in the standard five-yearly review, 
there are likely to be high feelings on both sides 
of the table. That is, far from smoothing the path 
to cooperation, stability and certainty, the dispute 
settlement processes of the LPFS Title could have 
exactly the opposite effect. That, inevitably, will 
discourage investment in anything that depends on 
the smooth flow of UK-EU trade.
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CONCLUSION
The provisions for level playing field issues in the 
TCA were contentious in negotiation and complex in 
outcome. Much of the area lies outside the normal 
dispute settlement procedure and in some cases 
bespoke procedures replace or supplement it. The 
management of subsidy control and non-regressions 
in the areas of labour and social standards and 
environment and climate are of a traditional kind, 
although in each case with rather more precision and 
bite than elsewhere, and in the case of subsidies 
the TCA comes with institutional requirements. The 
greater innovations concern procedures to deal 
with imbalances arising from future labour and 
environmental policies and the potential for review 
of the balance of the entire trade heading, which are 
additional to the more normal five-yearly reviews of 
the whole agreement. The innovative clauses are 
quite unknown quantities but unless there is great 
political self-control and forbearance, they have 
a capacity to create perpetual wrangling and bad 
feeling between the UK and the EU. 
The Annex presents a table summarising the 
dispute settlement procedures applicable to the 
level playing field areas. 
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ANNEX
Dispute mechanisms for the Level Playing Field















Main TCA Dispute 
settlement mechanism 
(Part Six, Title I)
Affirming net-zero targets (Art 
1.1.3)
x x x 11
Affirming precautionary approach 
(Art 1.2.2)
x
Competition policy (Ch 2)
Subsidy control (Ch 3) (note 
additional provisions for 
consultations and remedial 
measures are set out in 3.8 and 
3.12)
x x (with exception of 
provision on independent 
body and cooperation (Art 
3.9) courts (Art 3.10))
State-owned enterprises, 
enterprises with special rights, 
designated monopolies (Ch 4)
x
Taxation (Ch 5)
Labour and social standards (Ch 
6) (not including social security 
and pensions)
x x x x
Environment and climate (Ch 7) x x x x
Other (international and 
multilateral) instruments for trade 
and sustainable development 
(with emphasis on labour and 
environment) (Ch 8)
x x
11  Note that under LPFS Art 1.3 net-zero targets appears to be excluded from the main dispute settlement mechanism; however, it does not 
appear in the list of exclusions from the main dispute mechanism under Art INST.10.2(e). This significant discrepancy should be clarified. 
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